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Abstract
Risk is part of the fabric of every business; surprisingly, there is lit-
tle work on establishing best practices for systematic, repeatable risk
identification, arguably the first step of any risk management process.
In this paper, we present a proposal that constitutes a more holistic
risk management approach, a methodology for computer-supported
risk identification is proposed that may lead to more consistent (ob-
jective, repeatable) risk analysis.
1 Introduction
Pursuing any kind of business activity is inseparably interwoven with be-
ing exposed to different kinds of risk [4, 3, 5, 20, 10]: Is the customer I am
dealing with liquid and honest, i.e. can I rely on being paid? Are my ven-
dors delivering my supplies punctually, and to the quality I need? Am I
in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations (commercial law,
health & safety, financial reporting, tax, human resources etc.)? Are my
products and services still relevant, or is demand shrinking or are markets
disrupted by new inventions or commoditization of technologies? Are my
competitors outperforming my product or undercutting my pricing? Does
my business have the right staff in terms of skills? Am I setting the right
priorities? Is the cash flow positive and are the profit margins acceptable?
Am I exposed to currency exchange risk because many of my customers are
in different currency zones? Are my offices in countries that are politically
stable as well as free from natural disasters so that they can carry out their
business activities in an undisturbed way?
The task of finding the comprehensive set of risks faced by an entity—
its risk register—is known as Risk identification.
1.1 Motivation
Risk identification is the first step in any comprehensive risk management
cycle, and to date it has been carried our for many several reasons:
• The management of a business genuinely wants to learn about the
risks that the business may suffer from, as part of business planning,
project management [17] or strategic planning activities, or just for
day-to-day operational use;
• the business may be obliged to report risks to a regulator, for exam-
ple in the case of U.S. public companies the Form 10-K filing must
be annually submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and it includes a section (“ITEM 7A. Quantitative and Quali-
tative Disclosures About Market Risk”) on risks [22];
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• before an acquisition or Initial Public Offering (IPO) material risks
have to be formally disclosed to potential acquiring entities and po-
tential investors/shareholders; or
• a person looking for a job may want to learn about the risks of a po-
tential employer before submitting a formal application to it, to ascer-
tain the economic viability of the company and its the adherence to
his or her ethical standards (or the other way round);
• a bank may carry out a comprehensive risk analysis in order to estab-
lish whether or not to extend the credit line for a company that is one
of their clients;
• an investment manager may hold a portfolio of companies he or she
has invested in, and may therefore want to ensure that the investment
portfolio is risk-balanced: the less overlap there is in the kind of risks
that the portfolio is exposed to, the better.
To date, there has been no automated tool support for the risk identi-
fication phase of the risk management process: traditionally, people have
drawn up lists or spreadsheets of business risks from scratch by convening
informal meetings, typical starting out with a blank sheet. The insufficiency
of risk identification has been pointed out before, notably in the context of
SEC filings, where risks are often obtained from competitors’ lists via copy
& paste. This has a number of disadvantages. First, it is unlikely that a
list created from scratch in one session is comprehensive. Second, the ap-
proach of making up the risk register in a meeting without looking at any
data means the risk register will not be complete: very likely, the risks iden-
tified thus will only be the more obvious cases.
In this paper, we propose a technology that has the potential to provide
the basis for a superior approach, a computer-supported risk identification
process. It accomplishes this by supporting humans with automation help
in eliciting evidence for risk exposure from archives and feeds of trusted
prose text, such as news, earnings call transcripts or brokerage documents.
1.2 Definitions
A risk is a potential future event or situation that has adversarial implica-
tions; it is the possibility of something bad happening in the future. A bad
event is when something that once was just a risk—whether it was recog-
nized before or not—has materialized, i.e. it has actually happened. Accord-
ing to this terminology, a risk already incorporates a potential modality,
and therefore it makes no sense to speak of a potential risk, as that is already
implied in the risk term. Events can unfold, i.e. they can change their spatio-
temporal scope, which may include other, dependent risks materializing in
the process.
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.1  Risk management plan
.2  Activity cost estimates
.3  Activity duration estimates
.4  Scope baselines
.5  Stakeholder register
.6  Cost management plan
.7  Schedule management
      plan
.8  Schedule management
      plan
.9   Project documents
.10 Enterprise environment
       factors
.11 Organizational process
      assets
.1 Documentation reviews
.2 Information gathering
     techniques
.3 Checklist analysis
.4 Assumption analysis
.5 Diagramming techniques
.6 SWOT analysis
.7 Expert judgment
OutputsTools & Techniques
.1 Risk register
Inputs
Figure 1: The PMI’s Identify Risks Process (11–6): Inputs, Tools & Tech-
niques, and Outputs [17, Section 11.2].
2 Risk Identification
2.1 Risk Identification as Part of Project Management
Traditional best practices for project management describe risk identifica-
tion as an early step in a sequence of activities including Risk Management
Planning, Risk Identification, Qualitative Risk Analysis, Quantitative Risk
Analysis, Risk Response Planning and Risk Monitoring and Control [17].
However, while the importance of risk identification is acknowledged, au-
tomated tool support often is not addressed [12, 17].
The best practices in project management documented by the Project
Management Institute (PMI) suggest the risk register be generated as out-
put by a set of tools from a set of inputs (Fig. 1). “Participants in risk identi-
fication activities can include the following: project manager, project team
members, risk management team (if assigned), customers, subject matter
experts from outside the project team, end users, other project managers,
stakeholders, and risk management experts.” [17, Section 11.2] Project doc-
uments and enterprise environmental factors are listed as inputs, and they
include (ibd., partially cited):
• Assumptions log
• Other project information proven to be valuable in identifying risk
• Published information, including commercial databases
• Academic studies
• Published checklists
• Industry studies, and
• Risk attitudes.
While some of these sources of evidence may include prose instances of
risks, no mention is made of tool support to locate them. In this paper, we
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take the position that within large collections of text such as news archives,
risk register elements can lie buried, and that we will need computer sup-
port to unravel them.
Kerzner (2009) recommends “surveys of the project, customer, and users
for potential concerns” [12, p. 755], and gives a list of typical project risks;
clearly as of its publication date, automatic tool support for risk identifica-
tion was not yet on the horizon, and it is hoped that this paper will generate
initial awareness in favor of automated or semi-automated methods to col-
lect evidence from textual data.
2.2 Codification of Risk Identification in Standards
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Interna-
tional Engineering Commission (IEC) have produced a codification of ter-
minology and best practices for risk management, including risk identifi-
cation techniques [1, 2]. However, because the standard was issued in 2009,
it predates first attempts to develop computerized tools to support the risk
identification stage of the risk management process [14].
2.3 Three Aspects of a Risk
Key problems of risk management include (1) how to model risk, (2) how
to obtain data for a chosen model so that it can be used in practice, and (3)
what decisions to take based on the risks.
A risk R basically has three properties to characterize it:
• the risk type RT : a name for the description of the risk that character-
izes the nature of the adversarial potential;
• a likelihoodRL: the estimated odds how likely the risk happens within
a certain time frame (e.g. 6 months) or not;
• its impact RI : if it materializes, what is the severity of the damage
caused. This could be expressed as minimum, expected and maxi-
mum loss in USD, for example, akin to loss databases used by insur-
ances.
We can write in short: R = (RT , RL, RI). Unfortunately, the probability
of an event and its impact are often confused by laypersons and experts
alike. A particularly common error is to take the frequency of mention of
a risk type as a proxy for its probability: while in some cases this makes
sense, for example if there are increasingly frequent reports of political un-
rest coming from a country, this may indeed be suggestive of an imminent
civil war or revolution, in many cases the frequent mention of a risk re-
flects a more extensive, detailed discussion, which may actually indicate
less risk (well scrutinized means better understood). We will focus on the
5
Acme Inc.
Risk Type
office fire risk
cash-flow risk
litigation risk
demand risk
(a) Simple Risk Register.
Acme Inc.
No. Risk Type Likelihood Impact
1 office fire risk low high
2 cash-flow risk medium fatal
3 litigation risk medium high
4 demand risk medium high
(b) Extended Risk Register.
Figure 2: Risk Register for a fictional publishing company. (a) In its simplest
form, it is a set comprising the list of risk types (left). (b) The extended risk
register for our fictional company shows the 3 essential attributes of each
risk R = (RT , RL, RI) (right).
risk identification step in this paper; for risk likelihood assessment and im-
pact assessment we refer the reader to the literature.
Regarding the modeling of risk, one of the easiest approaches is sim-
ply listing the risk types that a company is exposed to, the risk register (Fig-
ure 2a); at the most sophisticated end of the spectrum, complex mathemati-
cal graph-based models could simulate propagation of risk evidence, prob-
abilities and causality through a graph-based model. The simple model
does not help you forecast how likely what will happen, but it permits you
to draw up a table of intended action to deal with each risk type. For the
more complex models they may quantify probability1 and impact, but it is
often hard to obtain data for its parameters, and to validate its appropriate-
ness as a model (are we modeling the world well?).
2.4 Evaluating Risk Register Quality
A risk register’s merit can be judged along a couple of dimensions:
• comprehensiveness: does it contain all or at least most risks that the
entity it pertains to is exposed to? This is difficult because in reality
we do not have access to the complete universe of risks for an entity
to compare to.
• currency: does it contain the risks significantly before they material-
ize?
• correctness: how correct are the risks in the risk register? This can be
measured by Precision, the percentage of correct risks that are also
present in the risk register. A risk can be deemed correct at differ-
ent levels: at the most basic level, a risk Ri is correctly included in
1 The ratings “high”, “medium” and “low” in Figure 2b are given only for didactic pur-
poses; a real assessment should quantify risk to avoid subjective differences in interpreation
of these terms [8, pp. 491-513].
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a risk register for an entity e if the linguistic context from which the
risk mention of r was extracted supports the inclusion decision. I.e.,
more human analysts would include, independently from each other,
the risk in the risk register based on the evidence than those that
don’t (human agreement is always an upper bound of machine per-
formance, at least if machines are evaluated against a human “ground
truth”, “gold standard” or “reference solution”).
• cost: all things being equal, a risk register is better than another if it
can be produced more cheaply than another.
In the absence of an “oracle” that provides the complete set of risks which
could be used for an absolute evaluation, one work-around is to have multi-
ple systems developed by different groups using different methods for risk
identification, each producing their own risk register for any given entity.
Then the set union of all of them could be formed and reviewed by human
judges, to create a resource that will be defined as the gold standard, and
against which also coverage and recall can be measured to accommodate
the aforementioned “completeness” quality criterion. This methodology,
known as pooling, has been applied successfully in the evaluation of search
engines at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in
the Text Retrieval Conferences (TREC).
2.5 Of Obvious Risks, Gray Swans and Black Swans
We can distinguish between three types of risks based on how surprised
we would be if they materialized:2
• Obvious risks3 can be important to bring to one’s attention (when their
materialization is imminent), but often we will want a filter to see only
the not-so-obvious;
• Gray Swans are defined by Taleb [20] as risks that are hard to antici-
pate because they are unlikely, and they may have huge impact once
they materialize; and
• Black Swan risks are defined by Taleb [20] as risks that cannot in prin-
ciple be anticipated, they have a very low likelihood, yet their impact
is enormous (black swans were believed not to exist until some very
2This is consistent with information theory’s view of surprise as information content
(less surpising→more predictible→ smaller information content).
3 Taleb also speaks of White Swans: “A White Swan for me would be a bridge that can
only handle these trucks, of course, and you are certain because you have seen from a
helicopter a few big six-ton trucks coming on the highway, and so you know the bridge is
going to collapse, it’s only a matter of time.” [18]
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finally discovered). If there exists a class of risks that cannot by defi-
nition be anticipated, it naturally is outside of the scope of computer-
supported techniques for detecting them (which is why we can focus
on “gray swans” here).
3 “Risk Mining” from Textual Sources
In this section, a method for computer-supported risk identification is de-
scribed at the conceptual level (Figure 3); for more detail, see [14, 16].
The method takes three inputs: (i) the World Wide Web, as indexed by
a search engine, (ii) a set of company names, the risks of which we are in-
terested in (e.g. a list of suppliers or an investment portfolio) and (iii) a
news archive comprising trusted news and analysis. The World Wide Web
(WWW) is used to mine a taxonomy of risk types, regardless of the entity
that is exposed to them; the WWW was chosen because it is the largest
existing online source of English prose. The news archive is the source of
information, from which we can extract the risks, essentially using jour-
nalists’ insights to “crowdsource” risk mentions from their reporting. The
company list is the real (variable) input, and the output is a risk register for
each company.
The method comprises of three steps: a taxonomy learning step, which
is run at least once to obtain an inventory of possible names for risks, a
tagging step in which company names and risk type names, respectively,
are annotated in the text of the news feed and/or news archive (by sim-
ple look-up, or possibly by a more sophisticated process such as machine
learning); and a classification step, in which a machine learning process
decides whether a risk mention instance candidate pair comprising a com-
pany name mention and a risk type mention (co-occurring in the same sen-
tence) are indeed related to each other, and that they indeed express a risk
exposure situation.
3.1 Machine Learning of Risk Type Taxonomies
The first step in our method creates a taxonomy of risk terms or phrases,
which we refer to as the risk taxonomy. Unlike human-created taxonomy,
the output is very rich in detail, but messy, “by machines, for machines” in
a way. We try to obtain a graph with as many IS-A relationships as possible
and “risk” as its root node by remote-controlling a Web search engine with
search queries for linguistic patterns likely to retrieve risk terms or phrases.
The method, desribed by Leidner and Schilder in more detail in
[14], makes use of so-called “Hearst patterns” (“financial risks such as
∗” is likely to retrieve Web pages, in which this pattern is followed by
“bankruptcy”, for instance) to induce a rich risk type vocabulary.
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WWW
Risk
Taxonomy
Learning
Company
Tagger
Risk
Tagger
Risk
Relation
Classifier
Company
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Risk Alerts
Risk Search
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Types
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Figure 3: Machine Learning for Computer-Supported Company Risk Ex-
posure Identification.
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Acme Inc.
Risk Type
office fire risk
cash-flow risk
copyright litigation risk
demand risk
(a)
Acme Inc.
Risk Type Count
office fire risk 1
cash-flow risk 2
copyright litigation risk 1
demand risk 14
(b)
Figure 4: Qualitative (left) and quantitative (right) risk register.
3.2 Tagging Company Names and Risk Type Names
Software to automatically annotate prose text with company names is
easily available today. Popular methods are based on name dictionaries
(gazetteers), linguistic rules and/or machine learning.
Likewise, terms and phrases from our risk taxonomy can be tagged or
looked up in sentences.
At the end of this step, each sentence that contains a mention of a com-
pany name and a risk type name has both marked up, which creates can-
didate pairs (tuples). Note that the pair (Microsoft, fine) could be
generated by both these sentences, one correct and one incorrect (i.e., un-
desirable in a risk mining context):
(a) Microsoft are facing a fine , said Bill Gates .
(b) I feel fine , said Microsoft ’s Bill Gates .
What we need is another step that filters out such false positives.
3.3 Machine Learning of Entity-Risk Type Relation Instances
In order to eliminate spourious false positives in our list of candidate risk
exposure relationship tuples, we can use the method described in Nugent
and Leidner [16] to classify each pair comprising a company name and a
risk term or phrase, taking into account the sentential context in which they
occur. For example, supervised machine learning is capable of distinguish-
ing cases (a) and (b) in the previous section after a few hundred training
sentences have been annotated by human experts to induce a statistical
model from that generalizes the evidence provided in these.
3.4 Aggregating Risk Registers
Once risk company-relation mentions have been identified and stored, they
can be aggregated so as to form the actual risk register. The naive way of
doing this is by forming the set of all risk mention instance tuples for each
company Ci, i.e. to gather (Ci, Rj) for all js to get the risk register for one
company Ci.
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Note that a higher frequency indicates merely an increased number
of mentions of a risk, which is not identical, but may in some cases be
correlated with, a higher likelihood for the risk to materialize: a spike in
mentions of “earthquake” is likely to result from imminent or actual earth-
quakes, but a spike in “acquisition” may or not preceed the acquisition of
a company; some risks are less likely to materialize just because they are
mentioned often, and that is because all public focus is on the topic, so the
risk is at least not overlooked.
Once a risk register is aggregated, it can be shown to a human analyst
for his or her perusal; however, it makes sense to regularly update the risk
register as part of the Risk Monitoring and Control activity [17] based on
new relationships mined that may not have been seen by the system before.
By retrieving mentions of risks related to companies, risk mining from
text supports the three goals of risk measurement according to Coleman [7]:
(1) uncovering “known” risks, (2) making the known risks easier to see,
and (3) trying to understand and uncover the “unknown” or unanticipated
risks.
3.5 Case Study: Starbucks Corporation
At the time of writing, Starbucks Corporation is a US-American coffee com-
pany that is operating coffee retail stores internationally. Civil unrest risk is
perhaps not the most obvious risk type associated with this venture, yet
our system, Thomson Reuters Risk IdentifierTM, included this risk type in
Starbucks’ risk register. Was it an error? Well, the evidence showed that a
Starbucks cafe was used by student protesters as a base to organize their
demonstration. If you think about it, it makes sense, as the perfect place
for organizing a demo is centrally located, has free wireless Internet access,
and serves coffee.
Once this risk type is entering the radar of the corporate risk manager
of Starbucks, they can act on it. There are many ways to handle the risk
(either installing house rules that ban demo organizers, or embracing the
student protesters by launching a campaign “We welcome the student rev-
olution!”); the point is that it would be unlikely that this kind of risk could
be conceived using traditional risk identification techniques (i.e., a board-
room meeting with an empty Excel spreadsheet).
4 Managing Identified Risks
Once the risk identification, likelihood and impact assessments have con-
cluded, a risk management plan [17] should define the actions to be taken
to influence the risks in the company’s favor (Figure 5).
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Acme Inc.
Risk Type Management
office fire risk transfer (buy fire insurance)
cash-flow risk mitigate (apply for credit line)
copyright litigation mitigate (submit manuscripts to plagiarism checker)
demand risk accept (do nothing)
Figure 5: A Risk Management Plan.
5 From Individual Risk to Risk Ecosystem
5.1 Individual vs Systemic Risk
Risks can be investigated in isolation; however, quite often, a chain of
follow-up risks is conceivable. Risk-risk connections can be causal or cor-
related in nature: if a country is exposed to earthquake risk, then its citi-
zen may be exposed to hygiene risk since it is likely that water pipes may
burst. The propagation of risk functions regardless of the type of risk, from
hygiene risks to financial risks.
In 1995, Barings Bank failed (caused by unauthorized trading by Nick
Leeson, its head derivatives trader in Singapore) due to particular risks spe-
cific only to Barings (operational risk), whereas the 2008 failure of Lehman
Brothers, AIG, and others was part of a systemic meltdown of global finan-
cial systems caused by bad risk management in the real estate and credit
markets.4
Risks can also be inherited from the geo-political environment of oper-
ations when countries are not politically stable [11] or ridden by poverty
or natural desasters. The World Economic Forum publishes an annual risk
report naming the most pressing global risks.[9]
5.2 Risk Propagation Along The Supply Chain
Imagine Chandni, a textile worker in an old but crowded factory building
(“sweat shop”) in Bangladesh. At the time of writing, she earns $0.19 per
hour, although she is only twelve years old. She is hungry and lacks sleep,
but kept like a slave, forced to work long hours, and locked in the factory so
she cannot leave. Figure 6 shows how Chandni’s personal risk register does
not affect her direct employer much (if she dies, there will be another likely
victim replacing her at the same cost), but the human rights violations she
faces can become a reputation risk for the international fashion brand that
subcontracted the textile factory that employs her.5
4This example is taken from.[7, Chapter 1]
5While Chandni’s name is made up, the example was inspired by a documentary show-
ing real cases similar to hers. Location, salary and work conditions are unfortunately not
12
hunger
slavery
abuse
sleep deprivation
Fashion BrandTextile FactoryChandni
reputation risk
Figure 6: Indirect Reputation Risk Resulting from Worker Explotation in
Bangladesh.
The suicides of several employees of Foxconn (also known as Hon Hai
Precision Industry Co., Ltd.), an electronics manufacturer that is a subcon-
tractor for Apple Inc. (inter alia), has been a prime example of reputation
damage by association. Foxconn was reported to exploit its workers, and
some of them took their lives. This in turn caused outrage by Apple Inc.’s
customers when reported by news media [19]6.
Another example is a manufacturer of cars, which may source its en-
gines from a vendor. The engine may contain spark plugs from yet another
vendor. If the spark plug vendor produces a very customized version for
the engine manufacturer that cannot easily be replaced, a cash-flow prob-
lem of the spark plug vendor may delay or even halt production for the
car manufacturer if no alternatives can be sourced easily. The more remote
and indirect in the supply chain graph the risk is from the company that is
ultimately (transitively) exposed, the harder it is to anticipate the problem
in the risk identification process. A solution could be the overlaying of risk
registers onto the supply chain graph (Figure 7).
Spark Plug Vendor Engine Manufacturer Car Company
Cash flow risk Supply chain risk Operational risk (delivery stop)
Figure 7: Supply Chain Risk: Risks Must be Propagated along the Supply
Chain Graph to Account for Transitivity.
5.3 Risk Model and Real World
For risk modeling to work very well, it ought to be connected to the real
world; in the risk case, such a “calibration” means the model is more
fictional.
6 The truth is often much more complex than journalistic headlines suggest; according
to Wikipedia (“Foxconn”), the suicide rate of Foxconn is actually below national average in
China. Note, however, that the fact whether or not Foxconn’s workers’ suicides is above or
below national average does not undo the reputation damage Foxconn, and by implication
Apple, suffered.
13
grounded in physical reality, and that it is aligned with actual truth as op-
posed to mere predictions, which ultimately are a form of fiction. A risk
model that is informed by real-life signals like loss databases (e.g. from
the insurance sector), project management databases (as gathered by the
project management offices in corporations) will compare favorable to one
that is not linked to the business operation.
Ideally this connection between risk model and risk reality is bidirec-
tional: the world informs the model, the model makes predictions, predic-
tions are compared with real outcomes as risk do or do not materialize, and
outcomes are fed back to improve models. For example, an identified cash
flow risk could be measured legal by how small we permit cash reserves to
become, and by comparing the current balance to the lowest previous low.
Or, when identifying legal risk, we ought to measure actual legal services
and litigation cost and feed it back into our model.
For an organization to be effective, risk modeling and risk management
cannot operate separately from other parts of the business (financial, legal,
operational departments).
5.4 Portfolio Risk
Given two publishing companies, Acme Inc. and Rainforest Publishing
Inc., they will have very different risk registers (Fig. ??; they share the risks
common to all publishing companies, but there will be a set of risks pecu-
liar to individual companies based on their unique name (e.g. trademark
violation risk), location (demand risk), pricing (competitive risk), kind of
publications offered (sourcing risk, demand risk), advertising and market-
ing mix (operational risk), and so on.
Ed G. Reedy is an investment manager in charge of 250 million US$ in-
vestment assets. At any time, he holds a portfolio of securities (e.g. shares,
options, forward contracts), which make him a stakeholder in the well-
being, and therefore also in the risk exposure, of the underlying companies
that make up his portfolio.
His portfolio comprises five companies, each exposed to a number of
partly different, partly overlapping risks (Fig. 8), and it was assembled in a
way that ensures the companies have high-growth potential, and their risk
as far as “fundamentals” (financial base numbers like revenue, EBITDA
etc.) are not strongly correlated [15]. Once we can look at the risk register
for a company (after extracting it from news text using risk mining, and
having the output vetted by a human analyst), we can scrutinize the port-
folio risk based on the qualitative risk types (as opposed to scrutinizing it
based on fundamentals-based correlation only) by looking at risk overlap,
to get a different perspektive on risk.7
7 [21] suggests that including a diversity of sources of evidence (expert diversity) is one
14
Risk A Risk B Risk C Risk D ... Risk J Risk K
Company A z z
Company B z z
Company C z z
Company D z
Company E z z
Figure 8: Portfolio Risk: Sets of Risk Registers Are Better When They Do
Not Overlap a Lot.
5.5 Collective Behavior and Regulatory Impact
Companies that pay only lip service to regulation (i.e., they do whatever is
needed to formally comply in order to comply rather than in order to actually
reduce the risk exposure of their company) are generating a spiral of ever-
increasing regulatory oversight: because they have only a minimal interest
in actual risk reduction, more new disasters happen. Then based on mar-
kets with dysfunctional self-regulation, regulatory bodies generate more
and stricter regulations and impose them on companies. As a consequence,
the cost of compliance is increased by an attitude of “mere compliance”.
Of course, subsequent rounds of regulations will cause more expenses in
order to meet even minimal compliance be compliant, which in turn re-
inforces the “mere compliance” attitude further. This leads to a spiral of
ever-increasing regulation that may put markets in a regulatory gridlock
resulting in paralysis of the system (Fig. 9).
Therefore, it is crucial to implement risk management for its own sake,
and not just to be compliant. This might require re-aligning, re-vitalizing
or even re-building compliance functions. [6] points out the importance of
culture change in implementing better risk management regimes.
of the cornerstones of the best practices of forecasting.
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!
Issue
New Regulation
“Lip Service”
Compliance
More
Regulations
More Issues
More Issues
“Lip Service”
Compliance
More
Regulations
Figure 9: The “Regulatory Spiral of Death”: Implementing systems for the
sake of compliance only (i.e., paying only lip service to risk management)
may lead to systemic breakdown through over-regulation.
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A Some Notes on Traditional Axiomatic Probability
Theory
The beginning of every kind of probabilistic modeling is the definition
of the set of possible events that make up the total event universe Ω,
consistent with Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of probability [13]. For ex-
ample, when dealing with probabilities of a series of throws of coins
Ω = {Head;Tail}. However, it is an essential—even defining—property
of each model to leave out parts of reality, and what exactly is included
or not can vitally contribute to a model’s success. For example, a “bet-
ter” (in the sense of more complete) model could include the—admittedly
extremely rare—case that a coin lands on neither head nor tail, but on its
side: Ω = {Head;Side;Tail}. In the case of the toss of a coin, we may
disagree on the utility of including more and more (very unlikely) cases8
in the definition of the event space Ω, but in risk identification in general,
spanning up a very fine-grained or detailed universe or inventory of pos-
sibilities is actually crucial: if excluded, a hypothetical outcome cannot be
even assigned any probability (not even p = 0) in the later stages.
The traditional definition of Ω is as a static set, and this implies that ei-
ther an omniscient vantage point is required for who defines it, or there will
be disastrous consequences of omission. An alternative way to set up prob-
ability theory could conceivably define Ω(t) as a function of time, which in-
crementally grows and also gets more fragmented as new evidence (about
what can happen) surfaces. Such a dynamic version of probability theory,
especially under a Bayesian9 interpretation of probability, could potentially
account for “knowledge updates” of Ω. Imagine this sequence of events:
1. t = 0 (Start): Ω(t) := ∅
2. t = 1 : A tossed coin lands on “Tail”→ Ω(t) := {Tail}
3. t = 2 : Another toss of the same coin produces “Head” → Ω(t) :=
{Tail;Head}
... (Lots of events, but always either “Head” or “Tail”)
1,000,000. t = 999, 999 : Another toss of the same coin produces “Tail”→
Ω(t) := {Tail;Head} (i.e., no further updates of the set occurred). z
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